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Preventing Sexual Violence: Alternatives To Worrying About Recidivism
Abstract
How can it be that in the era in which almost one million Americans are on sex offender registries—most
of whom are publicly stigmatized on websites, banished from their homes, shunned from their jobs,
prevented from uniting with their families and traveling internationally, forced into homelessness, all of
which increases their risk for suicide, and shames their spouses and children, even if their offenses
occurred long in the past—that the #MeToo movement would explode, revealing widespread sexual
misconduct against women, by powerful men, protected by iconic institutions? How can we have had
three decades of the most aggressive, “spare-no-expense” laws ostensibly designed to prevent sexual
violence and, at the same time, observe the widespread failure of law enforcement agencies to take the
simple step of analyzing sexual assault kits, as a first step in the investigation of allegations of sexual
abuse? How can these phenomena co-exist?
This Article argues that this incongruity is not an ironic coincidence, but rather a flaw that goes to the
heart of our contemporary approach to sexual violence prevention. This flaw has, at its core, an almost
obsessive focus on recidivistic sexual violence. Understanding this central characteristic will illuminate a
framework for an alternative approach to our public policy on sexual violence, one in which the prevention
of recidivism plays but a small role in a more comprehensive approach to sexual violence and its place in
our culture
The flaws in the regulatory intervention policies are not an accidental characteristic, but arise from, and in
turn support and protect, the very phenomena underlying #MeToo and the SAK revelations: the cultural
attitudes, values and practices that allow sexual violence against women to flourish.
Indeed, the thesis is that our aggressive policies are, in a perverse way, designed precisely to protect this
aspect of our society—what feminists might call “the patriarchy”—from taking full accountability and
responsibility for its role in sexual violence. In this sense, we can say that #MeToo and SAK backlogs
persist not in spite of, but in significant measure because of the nature of the aggressive regulatory
policies addressed to sexual recidivism.
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banished from their homes, shunned from their jobs, prevented from uniting
with their families and traveling internationally, forced into homelessness,1 all
of which increases their risk for suicide,2 and shames their spouses and children,
even if their offenses occurred long in the past—that the #MeToo movement
would explode, revealing widespread sexual misconduct against women, by
powerful men, protected by iconic institutions?3 How can we have had three
decades of the most aggressive, “spare-no-expense” laws ostensibly designed
to prevent sexual violence and, at the same time, observe the widespread failure
of law enforcement agencies to take the simple step of analyzing sexual assault
kits,4 as a first step in the investigation of allegations of sexual abuse? How
can these phenomena co-exist?
This Article argues that this incongruity is not an ironic coincidence, but
rather a flaw that goes to the heart of our contemporary approach to sexual
violence prevention. This flaw has, at its core, an almost obsessive focus on
recidivistic sexual violence. Understanding this central characteristic will
illuminate a framework for an alternative approach to our public policy on
sexual violence, one in which the prevention of recidivism plays but a small
role in a more comprehensive approach to sexual violence and its place in our
culture.
The question posed by this symposium is whether there are alternatives to
long-term incarceration to address violent recidivism. My answer is a definitive
“yes,” along with a suggestion that the alternative entails reframing the
question. Our current system of long-term incarceration for sex offenders is the
1. Beth Schwartzapfel & Emily Kassie, Banished, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/10/03/banished
[https://perma.cc/6W3S-VDDA]
(documenting connection between residency restrictions and homelessness among sex offenders).
2. Moore Ctr. for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse, News Release: Children on Sex
Offender Registries at Greater Risk for Suicide Attempts, Study Suggests, JOHNS HOPKINS
BLOOMBERG SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-andinstitutes/moore-center- for-the-prevention-of-child-sexual-abuse/moore-prevention-news/childrenon-sex-offenderregistries-at-greater-risk-for-suicide-attempts [https://perma.cc/BBC4-TGJ3].
3. Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979/
[https://perma.cc/R9PJ-4W8U]. In addition to exposing misconduct and cover-ups, the movement has
also spawned some disturbing incidents of “mob rule.” See Times Editorial Board, Editorial:
Firing the Judge in Brock Turner Sex Assault Case Was a Step Toward Mob Rule, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-09-12/judge-brock-turner-sexassault-case- tennis?fbclid=IwAR2KwXtuIA_5g20xHtlkdhuBGAMQ-p3MhVkpqNUFMjfRad0UaZ-FfyfPqQ [https://perma.cc/T9ZW-P3MJ].
4. Jennifer C. Braceras, The Rape Kit ‘Backlog’ Narrative Lets Police Off the Hook, BOS. GLOBE
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/09/16/the-rape-kit-backlog-narrativelets-police-off-hook/WF4UkrHa58xVDbIn1FFyQI/story.html [https://perma.cc/ZCT6-MXXH].
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answer to a question that mistakenly focuses on recidivistic violence, causing a
larger problem. The solution is to broaden our focus to all sexual violence.
This Article examines a suite of laws that have come to characterize our
contemporary approach to sexual violence. These laws share several core
characteristics. As observed above, their key focus and justification is
recidivism prevention, specifically, reducing the rate at which individuals who
have been previously convicted of a sex offense commit another sex offense
upon release from punishment. The laws also share the claim that they are
“regulatory” and not “punitive,” and therefore not subject to the normal
constitutional constraints on punishment.5 This Article will refer to these laws
as “regulatory” laws or regime, or, for reasons that will become apparent,
“predator laws.”
Framing the central question about sexual violence in terms of managing
the risk of recidivistic violence presupposes that recidivism is one of the central
problems to be managed. It isn’t. The alternative is to put recidivistic violence
in its proper place, as a small part of the problem, and dismantle the regulatory
regime that has been built on the wildly exaggerated myths about recidivism.
To do this requires understanding that we have developed such a singular focus
on recidivism because it serves to protect traditional gender hierarchies.
The past three decades have produced a massive and wide-reaching
movement to incarcerate people convicted of sex offenses. In addition to
classic criminal justice responses—steadily increasing sentences6 and lengthy
periods of post-confinement supervision7—this space has seen an
unprecedented and unique reliance on regulatory means to achieve confinement
and incarceration. Such regulatory means include civil predictive confinement
(more commonly referred to as Sexually Violent Predator laws or Sex Offender
Civil Commitment),8 broad registration and public notification schemes,9 and a
variety of behavioral restrictions limiting where persons convicted of a sex
5. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89, 92–93, 96 (2003); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363
(1997); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005).
6. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT
SENTENCING PRACTICES: CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT OFFENSES SENTENCED IN
2017, at 12 (2019) (noting that in Minnesota, average pronounced prison sentence for First Degree
Criminal Sexual Conduct increased from 75 months in 1988 to 190 months in 2017); Kristen Budd &
Scott A. Desmond, Sex Offenders and Sex Crime Recidivism: Investigating the Role of Sentence Length
and Time Served, 58 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1481, 1482
(2014).
7. Budd & Desmond, supra note 6, at 1494.
8. ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS
AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 3 (2006) [hereinafter JANUS, FAILURE TO
PROTECT]/
9. Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Notification, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 397, 397, 400 (Erik Luna ed.,
2017).
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offense may reside and what online facilities they may use.10 The proliferation
of these aggressive forms of non-penal, non-bricks, and mortar incapacitation
has shown remarkable resistance to a robust, empirical critique11 and to a
growing wave of penal reforms that have addressed other aspects of mass
incarceration.12
There are sound reasons to conclude that these regulatory interventions fail
to achieve the goal ostensibly set for them: a reduction in sexual violence.13 In
fact, there is good evidence that these policies have perverse and
counterproductive effects that impede and impair efforts to prevent sexual
violence, such as distortion and misallocation of prevention resources,
impairment of reintegration efforts,14leading to increased recidivism and
impaired law enforcement,15 harm to families and victims, and deterrence of
reporting and prosecuting sex crimes.16 These policies are reactionary,
interstitial, atheoretical, and anti-empirical, and many critics identify these
characteristics as reasons for the lack of efficacy and counter-productivity of
the policies.17
But we will not be able to understand either the shortcomings of these
policies or the reason they are so persistent unless we explore their relationship
to the #MeToo movement, with its exposure of the powerful coverups and
sanctioning of sexual misconduct and the revelations of thousands of Sexual

10. Jacob Hutt, Offline: Challenging Internet and Social Media Bans for Individuals on
Supervision for Sex Offenses, 43 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 663, 665 (2019); Schwartzapfel
& Kassie, supra note 1.
11. Eric S. Janus, Holding our Sexual Violence Policy Accountable, in SEXUAL VIOLENCE:
EVIDENCE BASED POLICY AND PREVENTION 285, 295–96 (Elizabeth L. Jeglic & Cynthia
Calkins eds., 2016).
12. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (federal incarceration reform
excluding sex offenders); S. B. 7066, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019) (amending FLA. CONST. art
VI, § 4 by restoring voting rights to felons, but excluding sex offenders).
13. Sexual violence, like all violent crime, has seen a decline. But, as is argued below, the
evidence that the aggressive regulatory laws have contributed to that decline is weak. And, there is
good evidence that other approaches would be more effective and more cost-effective. See Grant
Duwe, What Has Worked and What Has Not with Minnesota Sex Offenders: A Review of the Evidence,
21 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 71, 82–84 (2015).
14. Beth M. Huebner, Kimberly R. Kras, & Breanne Pleggenkuhle, Structural Discrimination
and Social Stigma Among Individuals Incarcerated for Sexual Offenses: Reentry Across the RuralUrban Continuum, 57 CRIMINOLOGY 715, 718–19 (2019).
15. Janus, supra note 11, at 288–89, 299–30.
16. See Duwe, supra note 13, at 75.
17. Janus, supra note 11, at 290–300; Duwe, supra note 13, at 83.
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Assault Kits (SAK) sitting untested in police warehouses.18 Both of these
phenomena reveal deep veins of persistent cultural myths, attitudes, and
practices that allow sexual violence to flourish: “a criminal-justice system in
which police officers continue to reflexively disbelieve women who say they’ve
been raped;”19 a system in which the classic rape myths prevail,20 and in which
rape is only “real” if the woman who is raped fits some notion of the “perfect”
or “righteous” victim.21 These myths, and their pernicious undermining of the
prevention effort, continue to flourish despite the aggressive campaigns
underlying contemporary regulatory laws, campaigns that tout our societal
commitment to “spare no expense” in our unflagging effort to “save [the] next
innocent victim.”22
This Article argues that the flaws in the policies are not an accidental
characteristic, but arise from, and in turn support and protect, the very
phenomena underlying #MeToo and the SAK revelations: the cultural attitudes,
values and practices that allow sexual violence against women to flourish.
18. Ending the Rape Kit Backlog, RAPE, ABUSE, & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK,
https://www.rainn.org/content/take-action-end-dna-backlog [https://perma.cc/DWV5-T3EQ] (stating
at least 100,000 SAK’s have gone untested in warehouses); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie
with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197, 1204 (2014); Soraya
Chemaly, How Did the FBI Miss Over 1 Million Rapes?, NATION (June 27, 2014),
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-did-fbi-miss-over-1-million-rapes/ [https://perma.cc/A9UXP7PU].
19. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, An Epidemic of Disbelief, ATLANTIC, Aug. 2019, at 74; see also
Rachel Lovell, Misty Luminais, Daniel J. Flannery, Laura Overman, Duoduo Huang, Tiffany Walker,
& Dan R. Clark, Offending Patterns for Serial Sex Offenders Identified via the DNA Testing of
Previously Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits, 52 J. CRIM. JUST. 68, 69 (2017) (identifying as causes
of the backlog, inter alia, “victim-blaming behaviors and beliefs” and “budget cuts that reduced the
number of sexual assault investigators and crime lab personnel”).
20. See JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 79 (discussing of the classic rape
myths); 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 736 (James
H. Chadbourn rev. ed., 1970) (“The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the innocent man.”);
id. at 737 (“No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant’s
social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician.”).
21. See Hagerty, supra note 19. Historically, the victim must also have been Caucasian; in the
eyes of the law, “only white women could be raped.” Sarah Deer, Decolonizing Rape Law: A Native
Feminist Synthesis of Safety and Sovereignty, 24 WICAZO SA REV. 149, 151 (2009). Women
minorities remain the most likely group to be affected by the crime of rape and the most likely to
experience systemic barriers to reporting. See ELYSE SHAW, ARIANE HEGEWISCH, & CYNTHIA
HESS, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES., SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT AT
WORK:
UNDERSTANDING
THE
COSTS
2
(2018),
https://iwpr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/IWPR-sexual-harassment- brief_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F25F-A37Q];
Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE
& INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-violence
[https://perma.cc/3BJD-WDYK].
22. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 8.

824

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[103:819

Indeed, the thesis is that our aggressive policies are, in a perverse way, designed
precisely to protect this aspect of our society—what feminists might call “the
patriarchy”—from taking full accountability and responsibility for its role in
sexual violence. In this sense, we can say that #MeToo and SAK backlogs
persist not in spite of, but in significant measure because of the nature of the
aggressive regulatory policies addressed to sexual recidivism.
At the center of our policies is the notion of the “sex offender” as serial
recidivist predator, a distinct type of person lacking key capacities that mark
full civic personhood. This Article explores the origins of this idea, and its
implications, in particular its relationship to the deep flaws in current policies.
It demonstrates the falsity of the idea and explains how this particular figure of
the sex offender as serial predator gets its power and stickiness from the cultural
impetus to support and defend patriarchal power. I end by showing that
effective alternatives exist and argue that only the abolition of the regulatory
measures will open the way for policies that are uninfected by their antifeminist core.
A final introductory note concerns the nature of sexual violence, its
prevention, and the criminal justice system. Imagine a series of events,
beginning with a sexual assault, progressing through a report to authorities, the
law enforcement investigation, prosecutorial charging decision, the judicial
process, the correctional process, and finally the release back into the
community. Recidivism, by definition, occurs at the very last stage. And the
“attrition” along the way is staggering. By a large margin, most victims of
sexual assault do not report the assault to authorities.23 And in those cases that
are reported, the attrition is even steeper. According to a recent article in the
Atlantic: “[R]oughly 125,000 rapes are reported across the United States
. . . [b]ut in 49 out of every 50 rape cases, the alleged assailant goes free . .
. .”24 A focus on recidivism means attention to the very smallest end of the
funnel; it excludes nearly all sexual violence. This Article attempts to shed some
light on the reasons for this otherwise puzzling misdirection of our attention.
The precise opposite of the current approach to sexual violence prevention
is the public health approach, which has at its center a search for and attention

23. NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR., STATISTICS ABOUT SEXUAL
VIOLENCE 2 (2015), https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications_nsvrc_factsheet_mediapacket_statistics-about-sexual-violence_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA4X-QKR2].
24. Hagerty, supra note 19, at 74.
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to the root causes of sexual violence.25 #MeToo and the SAK crisis vividly
expose key root causes: prevailing attitudes and institutional practices that
facilitate, encourage, and valorize sexual harm, and protect sexual abusers. The
current regulatory approach directs our attention away from these factors,
because these factors constitute exactly the set of values that give men power,
the “patriarchy.” Yet it is the public health approach that most thoughtful
commentators, scientists, practitioners, and anti-violence advocates alike
unambiguously support.26
This Article is about alternatives. It suggests that our current recidivismbased approach focuses attention too far “downstream.” A broader field of
vision will direct our inquiry at a better question: can we make positive changes
further upstream? As one commentator observed about the SAK crisis:
This is the question that haunts every advocate, researcher, and
enlightened detective or prosecutor I spoke with: How many
rapes could have been prevented if the police had believed the
first victim, launched a thorough investigation, and caught the
rapist? How many women would have been spared a brutal
assault?27
II. HOW WE GOT HERE: A SHORT HISTORY
The historical development of the regulatory policies and laws has been
described in various sources.28 Sexual violence became a subject of intense
interest among feminist thinkers and reformers in the mid-1970s.29 These
reformers saw multiple problems with our societal responses to sexual violence.
Many of the problems were seen as tied to a series of “rape myths,” deeply
ingrained ideas about gender relations and gender roles that described the
archetypal rape.30 These broadly-held traditional societal attitudes portrayed

25. Pamela M. McMahon, The Public Health Approach to the Prevention of Sexual Violence, 12
SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 27, 28 (2000).
26. See Janus, supra note 11, at 289–90; Kathleen C. Basile, Implications of Public Health for
Policy on Sexual Violence, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 446, 448–49 (2003); Sarah DeGue,
Linda Anne Valle, Melissa K. Holt, Greta M. Massetti, Jennifer L. Matjasko & Andra Teten Tharp, A
Systematic Review of Primary Prevention Strategies for Sexual Violence Perpetration, 19
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 346, 346–62 (2014).
27. Hagerty, supra note 19, at 79.
28. See, e.g., JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 20–21; see also Eric S. Janus,
Sexual Violence, Gender Politics, and Outsider Jurisprudence: Lessons from the American Experience
in Prevention, in DANGEROUS PEOPLE: POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE 73, 73–75
(Bernadette McSherry & Patrick Keyzer eds., 2011).
29. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 81.
30. Id.
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sexual violence as the product of an aberrational psychology among rapists;
doubted women’s claims of rape, placing on them the burden to disprove
acquiescence and provocation; and generally asserted that women were safest
at home and in marriage, and most in danger in public.31 These myths shaped
law, policy, and practice.
Feminist thinkers and researchers challenged these myths. They asserted—
and provided empirical evidence—that rape was deeply rooted in the
“patriarchal” values and structures of the society, and therefore the product of
societal, rather than solely individual psychological (or biological) causes.32
Research showed that sexual violence was much more ubiquitous, and more a
characteristic of intimate relationships, than portrayed in the traditional view.33
In short, feminist theorists claimed, and researchers proved, that “collectively
women are more at risk of violence in intimate relations than in public
spaces.”34 Feminists, and other reformers, advocated for a series of reforms in
law and policy, broadening and modifying the definition of criminal sexual
conduct, and attempting to modify some of the law enforcement practices that
subjected rape victims to additional trauma.35
In challenging these myths and advocating for changes in law and practice
to reflect the non-mythical reality of sexual violence as feminists saw it, some
feminist ideas and reforms were deeply threatening to social conservatives.36
The fight about the nature of sexual violence grew to a stature and importance
similar to the parallel fights about gay rights,37 women’s roles in work and at
home,38 and abortion.39
31. Id. at 84.
32. Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape Law
Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 554–55 (1993);
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091, 1093 (1986).
33. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 32 at 570.
34. Elizabeth Stanko, Naturalising Danger: Women, Fear, and Personal Safety, in
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL ORDER 147, 150 (Mark Brown &
John Pratt eds., 2000). This portion of the text is based on Janus, supra note 28.
35. Eric Janus, Civil Commitment as Social Control: Managing the Risk of Sexual Violence, in
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL ORDER 71, 84 (Mark Brown & John
Pratt eds., 2000).
36. Janus, supra note 28, at 76–78; JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 84.
37. See ROGER N. LANCASTER, SEX PANIC AND THE PUNITIVE STATE 231 (2011).
Lancaster argues persuasively that the “sex panic” that has led to our current suite of regulatory laws
that “took shape during a period of cultural and political retrenchment in the wake of feminism and
gay liberation.” Id.
38. See SARA M. EVANS, TIDAL WAVE: HOW WOMEN CHANGED AMERICA AT
CENTURY’S END 308 (2003).
39. Id. at 46–47, 112, 182, 214.
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The challenge to the institutions of the patriarchy evoked fierce reactions,
symbolized in the 1991 Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and the
forceful and ruthless squashing of Anita Hill’s testimony about Justice
Thomas’s alleged sexually harassing behavior.40 It was at that very same period
that the modern regulatory regimes got their start. I have argued elsewhere that
these new laws provided a politically safe and powerful way for social
conservatives to manage the trajectory of feminist-inspired anti-violence policy
in a direction much more compatible with the traditional patriarchal views of
gender relations and sexual violence.41 I argue here that this new direction was
powered by a laser focus on recidivism and the creation of a new myth of
“frightening and high” recidivism among individuals released after a sex offense
conviction.
The origin stories of these laws are often told. They all follow the same
template: They involve young children or young women who were brutally
attacked, raped and killed. But the key similarity is that they all reflect
recidivist violence, attacks by individuals convicted of sex offenses who had
recently been released from their prison sentences. This focus on recidivist
violence is of central importance to understanding the development of law and
policy. As we shall see, in the culture war then raging, a focus on recidivist
violence allowed social conservatives, as well as the society as a whole, to
signal its proper concern about sexual violence, while protecting some of the
central values of the patriarchy against the perceived attacks inherent in the
feminist reforms.
III. “FRIGHTENING AND HIGH”
Very early in the development of these regulatory schemes, lawmakers and
courts focused on a particular justification for the new laws: sexual recidivism
rates that were purportedly extremely high. Particularly at the beginning of this
reform, the claim was tautologically true: that some sex offenders reoffended at
extremely high rates.42 A Fox News posting, for example, headlined Molesters
Often Strike Again, quoted a “forensic psychologist specializing in criminal
behavior and sex crimes”: “It happens all the time . . . . The dangerous ones
have a high recidivism rate.”43 But the trope soon transformed into a non-

40. JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF
CLARENCE THOMAS 99, 291–300, 343 (1994).
41. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 84; Janus, supra note 28, at 76–78.
42. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 48–49.
43. Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Molesters Often Strike Again, FOX NEWS (May 19,
2015), https://www.foxnews.com/story/molesters-often-strike-again [https://perma.cc/6D3YCAT3].
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tautological statement about “sex offenders” as a group.44 Most famously, the
U.S. Supreme Court authoritatively characterized “sex offenders” as having a
“frightening and high”45 rate of sexual recidivism, identifying that rate as
having been “estimated to be as high as 80%.”46 Ira Ellman and Tara Ellman
have traced the provenance—and baselessness—of this claim, which spread
rapidly, being cited nearly one hundred times by courts.47 Thoroughly
discredited, the meme nonetheless persists.48
The significance of this meme in shaping and justifying the new regime of
laws cannot be overstated. It is central to the development and strengthening
of the “sex offender” as the outsider, the other. It is central to the focus
downstream, rather than on root causes. It is, thus, central to the strength of the
predator laws as a bulwark against a feminist approach to sexual violence.
Begin by noting that the Supreme Court’s discussion in Smith v. Doe49—
occurring in connection with its vetting of registration laws—applied across the
board to “sex offenders.”50 The Court explicitly treated “sex offenders” as a
“class,” referring to “the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders
and their dangerousness as a class.”51 The Court thus framed and created a
“type” or taxon, a natural grouping of human beings, all of whom shared the
key characteristic of “dangerousness.”52
The Court’s language suggests that “sex offenders” are almost certain to
rape again. This meme underlies two critical characteristics of our modern
predator laws and the “sex offenders” they target. The first is the sex offender
as “other.” The second is the sex offender as serial predator.
A. The Sex Offender as “Other”
The ostensive almost certain return to sexual crime upon release from
incarceration strongly implies that “sex offenders” do not learn from the

44. See JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 48 (detailing examples of legislative
findings asserting that “[s]ex offenders” are “extremely likely” or “particularly likely” or “high[ly
likely]” to “repeat their offenses” after release from imprisonment).
45. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002).
46. McKune, 536 U.S. at 33.
47. Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial
Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 497 (2015).
48. Jones v. Cty. of Suffolk, 936 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2019); People ex rel. T.B., 2019
COA 89, ¶117, cert. granted, No.19SC690, 2020 WL 529206 (Colo. Feb. 3, 2020).
49. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
50. Id. at 89.
51. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
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experience of harsh punishment. It suggests an impairment in the ability to
control or choose one’s behavior, an absence of the “free will” that normal
humans have. As “free will” is a fundamental prerequisite for full civic
personhood, its absence entails a psychological defect in “sex offenders” that
differentiates them from “normals” on a critical aspect of humanhood.
This construction of the sex offender as the “other” is most explicit in
connection with the courts’ justification of the use of civil commitment schemes
to lock up people after they have served their sentences. In order to find
constitutional justification for these predictive confinement schemes, the courts
explicitly characterize the individuals the laws target as exhibiting a “mental
abnormality” sufficient to “distinguish” them from “dangerous but typical
recidivist[s].”53 But the widespread citation of the “frightening and high” meme
as justification for registration, notification and presence restrictions
demonstrates that the abnormal psychological model pervades the popular and
judicial understanding of all of the regulatory laws.54 As Beth Heubner,
Kimberly Kras, and Breanne Pleggenkuhle write:
shaped by several stereotypes including the homogeneity of
offending, unresponsiveness to treatment, and high rates of
reoffending. [s]ociety applies a “moral-deviate script” to
individuals convicted of sexual offenses, which describes the
perceived immorality underlying their behavior and serving as
a label that cannot be shed. The “sex offender” status is seen
as a feature within the person rather than as a label affixed to
him or her or as a characteristic.55
The role that “recidivism” plays in the origins and legitimization of the
contemporary regulatory regime is highlighted by contrasting the mechanisms
of past sex panics. These movements, and the laws they spawned, have always
constructed their targets as the “other,” but their focus was not so much on
recidivism—the commission of another sex crime by a previously convicted
individual—but rather the prediction and prevention of criminal activity by
mentally defective individuals. The recidivism meme leads to the same kind of
explanation for sexual violence, but without “the racist and homophobic
dispositions of the earlier panics.”56

53. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
54. See Huebner, Kras & Pleggenkuhle, supra note 14, at 717 (arguing that the regulatory laws
simultaneously “fuel[]” and “construct[]” the stigma of being a “sex offender”).
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. Roger Lancaster argues that “the racist and homophobic dispositions of the earlier panics
became more subtle and less visible, while progressive rhetoric became more pronounced.”
LANCASTER, supra note 37, at 220.
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For example, the sex crime panic that took place in Iowa in the 1960s was
directed at closeted homosexual men who were plucked from their everyday
lives and shuttled off to “treatment” centers.57 It was not recidivism that was
targeted, but rather the mentally defective “psychopath,” a term that was used
as a “code word for homosexual.”58 Similarly, Molly Ladd-Taylor traces the
origins of Minnesota Sex Psychopath law in 1939 to the goal of Progressive
reformers to “identify[] and contain[] would-be criminals before they
committed a crime.”59 The brutal murder that was the immediate catalyst for
the passage of the Minnesota law led to a focus not on recidivists, but on
“morons, defectives, and the insane. . . . ‘[P]ederasts, exhibitionists,
masochists, auto-eroticists were gathered up and questioned.’”60 The popular
press claimed “that psychiatrists were nearly unanimous that almost all
potential sex murderers could be identified and taken into custody for minor
offenses before they launched their sex crimes careers.”61
B..The Sex Offender as “Serial Predator”
The “frightening and high” meme also entails that most sexual violence is
the work of a discrete group of recidivist “serial predators.” After all, if those
presently identified as sex offenders are “almost certain” to reoffend upon
release from prison, then most future sex offenses will be committed by those
recidivists, and most future “sex offenders” will be people who have been
previously convicted of a sexual offense. Unless the number of reported sex
offenses is (contra-factually) constantly growing, we would expect the 80% of
offenders who recidivate to constitute about 80% of the offenders arrested and
convicted of new offenses (also, contra-factually).62

57. See NEIL MILLER, SEX-CRIME PANIC: A JOURNEY TO THE PARANOID HEART
OF THE 1950S xvi–xvii, 148, 150 (2002).
58. Molly Ladd-Taylor, “Ravished by Some Moron”: The Eugenic Origins of the Minnesota
Psychopathic Personality Act of 1939, 31 J. POL’Y HIST. 192, 194 (2019).
59. Id. at 195–96.
60. Id. at 200.
61. Id. at 202.
62. I use the term “serial predator” to refer to a specific pattern of behavior: sexual reoffending
after having been convicted of a previous sex offense. As the text below demonstrates, the percent of
such recidivists is much lower than commonly believed. There are, to be sure, individuals who are
serial rapists, in the sense that they commit two or more sexual assaults. There is research suggesting
that “serial sex offending is quite common,” in the sense that some offenders who are not apprehended
commit an additional offense. See Hagerty, supra note 19, at 78 (reporting on the “sheer number of
repeat offenders” revealed in the program to test warehoused Sexual Assault Kits). But other
researchers warn against putting emphasis on serial rapists as perpetrators of campus sexual assault,
stating that:
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Put these two ideas together, and you have the foundations for modern sexoffender regulation: Policies designed to separate a discrete group of
individuals who are inherently (psychologically, biologically) different-in-kind
from the norm, and who are responsible for most of the sexual violence in our
society. Therein lies both the moral and utilitarian justifications for placing
“sex offenders” in a reduced rights zone and relying principally on a policy of
separation and exclusion to effectuate a prevention agenda.
These policy foundations reinforce an anti-feminist agenda with a dual
pronged approach. The regulatory laws are emblazoned with the traditional
notion that sexual violence is aberrant rather than systemic, perpetrated by
abnormal men rather than men acting out, and protected by, the norms of the
society. Simultaneously, these laws are branded as aggressive and innovative,63
thus inoculating the broader society from the argument that its own norms allow
sexual violence to flourish.
I develop these ideas in my 2006 book titled Failure to Protect,64 where I
argue that these laws also serve the deep and historical need for western liberal
democracies to define full civic personhood (“we the people”) by contrasting it
with an outsider group whose rights need not be respected by the majority.65
Rose Corrigan’s 2006 article makes a similar point about the relationship
between the regulatory approach and the protection of traditional norms for
gender relations:
Existing research fails to grasp that Megan’s Law is not solely
an illustration of “governing through crime” interchangeable
with other new punitive measures. Crucial to the success of
Megan’s Law is its rejection of feminist challenges to social,
cultural, economic, and legal institutions that structure gender,
sexuality, violence, and the family. Megan’s Law is a viable
project precisely because it so successfully distorts progressive,
feminist rhetoric and tactics for ends that further the coercive
and discriminatory uses of state
Although a small group of men perpetrated rape across multiple college years, they
constituted a significant minority of those who committed college rape and did not
compose the group at highest risk of perpetrating rape when entering college. Exclusive
emphasis on serial predation to guide risk identification, judicial response, and rapeprevention programs is misguided.
Kevin M. Swartout, Mary P. Koss, Jacquelyn W. White, Martie P. Thompson, Antonia Abbey &
Alexandra L. Bellis, Trajectory Analysis of the Campus Serial Rapist Assumption, 169 JAMA
PEDIATRICS 1148, 1148 (2015).
63. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 3.
64. Id.
65. For further discussion, see id. at 5–6.
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power. . . . Antirape activists argued that rape was the product
of social conditions that normalized sexual violence; Megan’s
Law depicts sexually violent behavior as the product of
individual mental defects and pathology. 66
Understanding the regulatory legal regime in this way helps explain its
stickiness, its staying power over the years. It is not simply the vividness of
crimes against children; it is that highlighting these particular crimes, in this
particular pattern, keeps our focus away from the patterns by which the
“patriarchy” allows sexual violence to flourish. By focusing on a particular
image of “the recidivist,” the “serial predator,” as a psychologically different
“other,” we direct attention away from the social norms that protect and
encourage sexual misconduct and we lessen the pressure for more fundamental
change to those central pillars of male power in our society.67
IV. THE MYTH OF THE SERIAL PREDATOR
The “frightening and high” myth is a faulty foundation for our sexual
violence prevention policy. In constructing the figure of the serial predator, it
mischaracterizes the nature of sexual violence and misdirects our prevention
efforts.
A. The “Frightening and High” Myth Grossly Exaggerates Sexual
Recidivism
The foundational myth of modern regulatory prevention policy holds that
almost all people convicted of a sex offense will, when allowed back in society,
commit another sex offense. In reality, the opposite appears to be true: almost
all people convicted of a sex offense refrain from reoffending sexually. In a
recent Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) study of sex offenders released from
prison, 92.3% of the individuals were not rearrested for a new sex offense in
the nine-year follow up period.68 Even that statistic is likely to overstate the

66. Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 267, 275 (2006)
(internal citations omitted).
67. See LANCASTER, supra note 37, at 210 (describing how legislation “individualized the
experience of violence and was in conflict with feminism’s broader approach to systematic
inequalities”).
68. MARIEL ALPER & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM STATE PRISON:
A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP (2005–14)
4
(2019),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorsp9yfu0514.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FQU-7UC4].
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rearrest rate for the entire class of sex offenders.69 The BJS study was confined
to individuals released from prison.70 Thus, it does not include individuals who
were convicted of a sex offense but not sent to prison.71 This non-prison group
would include people sent to a local jail or placed on probation and is almost
certainly less risky than the group sent to prison.72 So, the recidivism rate for
the entire group of sex offenders is likely less than the 7.7% detected in the BJS
study.73
Of course, the fact that recidivism rates are much lower than asserted in the
“frightening and high” meme is not support for the assertion that sexual violence
is not an important problem in the country. In fact, sexual victimization is
relatively widespread.74 The rate of rape and sexual assault annually for
persons over twelve for example, is 1.4/1000 people,75 and the lifetime
prevalence of sexual victimization among women is 18.2%.76 But the focus on
recidivism suggests that recidivistic offending is the core of the problem.
In fact, as demonstrated below, it is not.
B. “Sex Offenders” are Heterogeneous with Respect to the Risk of
Recidivism
Part of the creation of the “frightening and high” myth is the notion that sex
offenders as a “class” are dangerous. But this assertion ignores the fact that
individuals previously convicted of sexual offenses present a wide variance in
the risk of re-offense.77 To be more precise, the level of risk posed by each

69. Thanks to Professor Ira Ellman for developing this important point. See Brief of Eighteen
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018)
(No. 18-386), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019).
70. ALPER & DUROSE, supra note 68, at 1.
71. Id.
72. Brief of Eighteen Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 69, at 16.
73. Id. at 8.
74. Scope of the Problem: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/scope-problem [https://perma.cc/G2WL-RQ2Q] (“Every 73 seconds
another American is sexually assaulted.”).
75. RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION,
2017,
at
3
(2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv17.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACZ8-8CZH].
76. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT
OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
SURVEY
22
(2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GE5V-CJA8].
77. LIN SONG & ROXANNE LIEB, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, ADULT
SEX OFFENDER RECIDIVISM: A
REVIEW OF
STUDIES 1
(1994),
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individual can be assessed, and subgroups that are meaningful in terms of risk
can be identified. To illustrate this point, consider the following examples:
• The State of Minnesota assigns a risk level to all sex
offenders who are about to be released from custody.78 In
a recent report, the State identified 15% as level 3 (the
highest risk), 29% as level 2, and 56% as level 1 (the
lowest risk).79
• In a study of California offenders, 8.9% were identified as
“well above average” risk; 20% as “above average risk,”
and 71% as “average or below average” risk.80
This heterogeneity is exhibited along other axes. Two of the most
significant are age and years of offense-free living in the community. Robert
Prentky, Howard Barbaree, and Eric Janus found that age-related “reductions
in recidivism among sex offenders are consistent across studies” and that the
“aging effect” is “one of the most robust findings in the field of criminology.”81
Philip Witt, John Furlong, Sean Hiscox, and James Maynard report that “The
odds of being sexually reconvicted declined by about 0.02 each year of
increasing age.”82
Karl Hanson, Andrew Harris, Elizabeth Letourneau, Maaike Helmus, and
David Thornton have reported on an even stronger relationship showing that
the risk of sexual re-offense declines with time offense-free in the community:
“risk predictably declines over time[,]” and “risk can be very low—so low, in
fact, that it becomes indistinguishable from the rate of spontaneous sexual
offenses for individuals with no history of sexual crime but who have a history

http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1161/Wsipp_Adult-Sex-Offender-Recidivism-A-Review-ofStudies_Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT5T-TTH4].
78. MINN. STAT. § 244.052 subdivs.2, 3(a)–(k) (2019).
79. Brian Collins, Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Presentation at the 2017 MnTASA Conference:
Residency Restrictions: Sound Public Policy or Tinfoil Hats? (Apr. 21, 2017) (on file with author).
80. SEUNG C. LEE, R. KARL HANSON, NYSSA FULLMER, JANET NEELEY, & KERRY
RAMOS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF STATIC-99R OVER 10
YEARS FOR SEXUAL OFFENDERS
IN
CALIFORNIA:2018
UPDATE,
11,
19
(2018),
http://saratso.org/pdf/Lee_Hanson_Fullmer_Neeley_Ramos_2018_The_Predictive_Validity_of_S_.p
df [https://perma.cc/7TEN-TTQF].
81. ROBERT A. PRENTKY, HOWARD E. BARBAREE, & ERIC S. JANUS, SEXUAL
PREDATORS: SOCIETY, RISK, AND THE LAW 112 (2015); see also Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing
Away the Key: Has the Adam Walsh Act Lowered the Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator
Commitments Too Far?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 391, 397 (2011).
82. Philip H. Witt, John S. Furlong, Sean P. Hiscox, & James H. Maynard, Age and Sex Offense
Recidivism, SEX OFFENDER LAW REP., Feb./Mar. 2015, at 1, 28.
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of nonsexual crime.”83 Each year in the community offense-free indicates a
12% decrease in the odds of reoffending, and this is true for offenders in all risk
categories.84 The clear implication from these findings is that sex offenders do
not pose a special risk of sexual recidivism forever, and that there is a point in
time when expending societal resources on special supervision of sex offenders
is wasteful.
C. Recidivist Sexual Offending is a Small Sliver of All Sexual Offending
Multiple studies establish that recidivist violence is a tiny fraction of all
sexual violence. Kelly Bonnar-Kidd reports that 96% of all arrests for sexual
crimes in New York involved individuals without previous sex crime
convictions.85 A government study of sex offenders released from prison in
1994 found that 86% had had no prior conviction for a sexual offense.86 The
number was similar (84%) in a study following prisoners released from prison
in 2005.87 The 1994 study also found that released offenders not convicted of
sex crimes accounted for 87% of the sex crimes committed by all prisoners
released from custody.88 In Pennsylvania, “more than 96 percent of defendants
charged with a sexual offense in 2016 had no criminal history of sexual
violence.”89 And a Minnesota study found that 93% of all sex offense
convictions were of first-time sex-offenders.90

83. R. Karl Hanson, Andrew J. R. Harris, Elizabeth Letourneau, L. Maaike Helmus, & David
Thornton, Reductions in Risk Based on Time Offense-Free in the Community: Once A Sexual Offender,
Not Always A Sexual Offender, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 48, 58 (2018).
84. Id. at 54.
85. Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws and Prevention of Sexual Violence or
Recidivism, 100 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 412, 414 (2010); see also Jeffrey C. Sandler, Naomi J.
Freeman,
& Kelly M. Socia, Does a Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of New York State’s Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Law, 14 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 284, 295 (2008) (showing that,
in N.Y., 95% of sex-offense arrestees between 1986 and 2006 were first-time sex offenders).
86. See PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT, & MATTHEW R. DUROSE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX
OFFENDERS
RELEASED
FROM
PRISON
IN
1994,
at
11
(2003),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4VG-FR6B].
87. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER, & HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S.
DEP’T JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005:
PATTERNS
FROM
2005
TO
2010,
at
10
(2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7G9-JQZG].
88. LANGAN, SCHMITT & DUROSE, supra note 86, at 24.
89. Joshua Vaughn, Failure-to-Comply Arrests Reveal Flaws in Sex Offender Registries,
APPEAL (Aug. 1, 2018), https://theappeal.org/skyrocketing-charges-for-failing-to-comply-withsex- offender-registries-reveal-their-flaws/ [https://perma.cc/7Z2C-JALZ].
90. Collins, supra note 79.
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There are several consequences of this insight. First, it reinforces the point
made above, that the serial predator model is false. If that model were true, we
would see a high percentage of repeated sexual offender arrests and
convictions. However, what we observe is that most convicted sex offenders
are first-time sex offenders, dispelling this myth. Secondly, it suggests that
policies that focus primarily on recidivist violence as a prevention strategy are
destined to have, at best, a small impact on sexual offending. After all, if
recidivist sexual violence constitutes only 4–7% of those arrested or convicted
for sexual violence, and, as Rachel Lovell, Misty Luminais, Daniel Flannery,
Laura Overman, Duoduo Huang, Tiffany Walker, and Dan Clark state,
“approximately 80% of rapes are unreported and of those that are reported, only
10% lead to a conviction[,]”91 even a large impact on recidivism will have only
a small impact on sexual violence overall. We get the same result if we come
at it slightly differently: The Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network reports
that only 500 perpetrators out of every 100,000 sexual assaults will receive a
felony conviction.92 According to the BJS recidivism statistics, forty (7.7% of
500) of those convicted will be rearrested for a new sex crime.93 Even if the
regulatory laws were to cut that recidivism in half, the change in sexual assaults
would be an imperceptible .02%. But, as the next section argues, there is little
evidence that the regulatory laws have any significant impact on recidivism.
V. THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT CURRENT
POLICIES ARE GENERALLY INEFFECTIVE AND PROBABLY HAVE
PERVERSE CONSEQUENCES
The likely consequences of current policies have been thoroughly described
in other sources.94 We can summarize as follows: civil commitment programs

91. Lovell, Luminais, Flannery, Overman, Huang, Walker & Clark, supra note 19, at 69 (citing
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT (2014). Note that other sources provide different reporting rates for sexual assault, but there
is widespread agreement that the reporting rates are well below half. See, e.g., NAT’L SEXUAL
VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR, supra note 23, at 2 (stating that 37% of sexual assaults are reported,
but only 12% of child sexual abuse, is reported to authorities.); The Criminal Justice System: Statistics,
RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justicesystem [https://perma.cc/RCR7- FNED] (stating that 23% of sexual assaults are reported to police).
92. See Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 91.
93. ALPER & DUROSE, supra note 68, at 5.
94. See, e.g., Deanna Cann & Deena A. Isom Scott, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions and
Homelessness: A Critical Look at South Carolina, CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2019) (“[S]uch
policies are repeatedly found to have extensive negative collateral consequences.”); Jill S. Levenson
& David
A. D’Amora, Social Policies Designed to Prevent Sexual Violence: The Emperor’s New Clothes?, 18
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 168, 180 (2007).
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are exceedingly expensive, have no demonstrable effect on the incidence of
sexual violence, and a very small effect on recidivistic sexual violence.95 The
latter effect arises from the brute fact of incapacitation; the former most likely
because the effect on recidivism is very small, and recidivism itself is a small
fraction of sexual offending.96 Largely unexplored is the resource-allocation
consequences of civil commitment programs. Their cost nationwide is
estimated to be in excess of half a billion dollars annually,97 exceeding the
amount budgeted (or requested) for all programs under the Violence Against
Women Act nationally in fiscal year 2020.98 There is strong evidence that these
programs do not achieve their articulated goal of confining only the “most
dangerous.”99
They over-commit initially and extend confinements
100
unnecessarily. These factors add to the likelihood that alternative uses for
the billions spent over the years would have more effective prevention
effects.101
95. See Duwe, supra note 13, at 83; Jeffrey C. Sandler & Naomi J. Freeman., Evaluation of New
York State’s Sex Offender Civil Management Assessment Process Recidivism Outcomes, 16
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 913, 913 (2017) (finding a reduction in sexual rearrest rate of 2.6
percentage points).
96. Kelly M. Socia, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Policies in Context, 16 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 909, 910 (2017) (“Therefore, in terms of reducing sexual assault victimization rates for
citizens, these programs will play only minor roles compared with broader, more comprehensive
reentry programs.”).
97. Andrew J. Harris, Policy Implications of New York’s Sex Offender Civil Management
Assessment Process, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 949, 950 (2017); Adam Deming, Sex
Offender Civil Commitment Programs: Current Practices, Characteristics, and Resident
Demographics, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 439, 442 (2008) (reporting that the total budgeted for SOCC
programs in 2007 was
$446 million). The budget for the California program in 2019 was $333 million. Barbara Koeppel,
Modern-Day Gulag in the Golden State, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (June 4,
2019), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/jun/6/modern-day-gulag-golden-state/
[https://perma.cc/35GF-V5R2].
98. NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT (VAWA) AND RELATED PROGRAM APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 17, 18, 19,
AND 20, at 1 (2020),
https://nnedv.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/Library_Policy_FY21_Approps_Chart_20Feb2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8A9C-MJEW] (stating that the President’s FY21 proposed budget for all
VAWA programs was $498.50 million).
99. Janus, supra note 11, at 295.
100. Id.
101. See Andrew J. Ahrendt & William T. O’Donohue, Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations:
Problems and Proposals, in SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: A CLINICAL SCIENCE
HANDBOOK 199, 210 (William T. O’Donohue & Daniel S. Bromberg eds., 2019) (“Research
examining the effectiveness of SVP civil commitment on recidivism has resulted in findings supporting
that the high cost of civil commitment and liberty deprivation is not worth the small benefit.”);
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN THE ACTUARIAL AGE 32 (2007);
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Presence and residence restrictions have repeatedly been shown to be
ineffective or, worse, counterproductive in that they actually increase sexual
reoffending.102 The fault likely lies in the false premise represented by the serial
predator model. Offending against children is a function of social, not spatial,
proximity.103
Registries and notification schemes are a bit more complicated. While
some studies have shown modest effects on recidivism, most likely due to the
improved information available to law enforcement, most studies have shown
no beneficial impact on recidivism or sex-crime arrest rates.104 One of the most
sophisticated studies, by J.J. Prescott and Jonah Rochoff, separated out the
effect of registration from notification.105 The authors concluded that public
notification likely increases recidivism, whereas registration may have a
deterrent effect on first time offending.106 But the authors state that the negative
effect on recidivism likely wipes out the beneficial effect of registration.107
Other perverse effects have been observed including:
• Changes in prosecutorial practices that reflect prosecutors’
reluctance to impose the harshness of registration,
especially on juveniles.108
• Possible creation of disincentives to reporting of sexual
assault.109
• Potential detrimental effects of false paradigms of sexual
assault. The predator model may impair prevention by
misdirecting self-protection actions on the part of potential
victims110, and in impairing the ability to recognize the
Eric S. Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an Empirically-Based
Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083, 1101–02 (2003).
102. Cann & Scott, supra note 94, at 10–11 (citing studies that find “no impact” on recidivism
or “increase the rates of sexual offending”).
103. Id.; Brief of Eighteen Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 69 at
8.
104. Janus, supra note 11, at 291–93; Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without
Function?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 207, 235 (2011).
105. J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws
Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 161, 180–81 (2011).
106. Id. at 181.
107. Id.
108. Janus, supra note 11, at 296–98.
109. Id.
110. Katherine Mangan, Sex-Assault Prevention Program Sees Results, and Raises Questions,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 12, 2015), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Sex-AssaultPrevention- Program/230861/?cid=at&utm_medium=en&utm_source=at [https://perma.cc/6RGHND38] (“Most women are oriented and trained and socialized to fear the stereotypical stranger rape
and to avoid the
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“warning signs of sexual behavior problems in siblings,
parents, children, cousins, or others to whom they are close
because they do not see them as ‘monsters.’”111
VI. THE REGULATORY REGIME IS BROADLY HARMFUL
By casting sex offenders as degraded others, the regulatory laws create a
dangerous revitalization of a jurisprudence of difference, continuing a
disgraceful thread of American jurisprudence in which one after another outgroups are excluded from full civic personhood.112 Underlying these laws is
the stereotype that membership in a particular “class” of people signifies an
inherent danger and degraded civic membership, justifying the creation of a
zone of diminished rights. The sex offender laws, in short, provide legitimacy
to this dangerous historical template.
These laws—both the past and the present—cause extreme pain among
their targets, their families, and friends.113 “[T]he individual’s life chances are
diminished, having ‘a cascade of negative effects on all manner of
opportunities.’ . . . [T]he social and structural stigmas . . . interact and
symbolically reproduce the very prison from which one is released.”114
The “othering” of sex offenders and the creation of the “serial predator”
model, entail a steep discount on the harm to persons with convictions, and by
extension, their families. In fact, it is a fair assessment that the pain caused by
these laws is invisible and does not count at all in the prevailing public
discourse.115 This is, of course, the obverse of the pain calculus giving rise to

underground parking garage or walking home alone at night across campus. That doesn’t protect them
from far-more-common threats.”).
111. JOAN TABACHNICK & ALISA KLEIN, A REASONED APPROACH: RESHAPING
SEX OFFENDER POLICY
TO
PREVENT
CHILD
SEXUAL
ABUSE
2
(2011),
https://www.atsa.com/pdfs/ppReasonedApproach.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5EW-CPWS].
112. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 100.
113. Cann & Scott, supra note 94, at 13 (finding a strong association between the implementation
of residence restriction policies and rates of homelessness for registered sex offenders in South
Carolina); Huebner, Kras, & Pleggenkuhle, supra note 14, at 717; Mary Katherine Huffman, Moral
Panic and the Politics of Fear: The Dubious Logic Underlying Sex Offender Registration Statutes and
Proposals for Restoring Measures of Judicial Discretion to Sex Offender Management, 4 VA. J. CRIM.
L. 241, 265 (2016).
114. Huebner, Kras, & Pleggenkuhle, supra note 14, at 717 (quoting Bruce G. Link & Jo C.
Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363, 373 (2001)).
115. Janus, supra note 11, at 295–96.
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the #MeToo movement, wherein it is only the pain of the perpetrator that
counts.116
To say that the pain to former offenders and their families is not the only
thing, is different from saying that it is nothing. In fact, rendering the pain of
registrants invisible, making them the “other,” has the perverse effect of
rendering the pain of most victims of sexual violence invisible as well. As we
have seen, the regulatory regime is premised on the serial predator model, and
this empirically inaccurate portrayal of sexual violence makes invisible the pain
of the victims who have been harmed by people who do not fit the serial
predator paradigm, and the victims whose harm could have been prevented by
policies framed to address the real problem, rather than the mythical serial
predator.
VII. ALTERNATIVES
The path to sexual violence prevention lies not in de-humanizing the
perpetrators, but in humanizing them. True prevention requires acknowledging
sexual assault not as an aberration, but as a ubiquitous part of our culture
interwoven and supported by some of our fundamental hierarchies and values.
If we seek efficacious prevention, we must abandon the serial predator model,
and adopt, in its place, a more complex and factually based understanding of
sexual violence that moves beyond the individual to the societal.
I offer that the first and key step to effective prevention is to understand the
engine driving the predator model. If I am correct, that power is the protection
of male privilege. The challenge is to transform the framing and the language
from dehumanizing and othering, to changing cultural norms; from the futile
and discredited attempt at ritual exile of evil, to a recognition that true
prevention requires comprehensive, empirically informed changes to social
norms, as well sensible and proportionate measures of accountability and
incapacitation.
A. Some Specific Alternatives
In that spirit, I present a non-exhaustive set of examples of changes and
approaches that would make a concrete, empirically supported difference in the
level of sexual violence. The three examples I present illustrate the principle
of comprehensiveness—they exhibit primary prevention as well as
interventions after harm has been done—and they are all examples of rigorous
116. X.
Birk,
Come
Clean,
Carleton,
MEDIUM
(May
25,
2018),
https://medium.com/@xbirk15/come-clean-carleton-7a9c1d9311a6 [https://perma.cc/BB4B-HUQA]
(“I vividly remember him scolding us for heedlessly ‘ruining the futures’ of the accused
students . . . .”).
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evaluation to determine efficacy. In short, they are a model for an alternative
approach to prevention.
1. Assault Prevention Training
Primary prevention arguably has the best opportunity to effectuate the
biggest change because it has the potential to be widely implemented at the
upstream end of the funnel. As Sarah DeGue, Linda Anne Valle, Melissa Holt,
Greta Massetti, Jennifer Matjasko, and Andra Teten Tharp and others point out:
“If a strategy is widely implemented, even a small effect on perpetration
behavior may have a large impact.”117 A strong example of this is the work of
Canadian researcher Charlene Senn, a social psychologist at the University of
Windsor, and her colleagues, Misha Eliasziw, Paula C. Barata, Wilfreda E.
Thurston, Ian R. Newby-Clark, H. Lorraine Radtke, and Karen L. Hobden, who
have conducted research on programs to reduce sexual assault on college
campuses.118 They reported in the New England Journal of Medicine that they
developed a program for college women and subjected it to rigorous study.119
They reported that, in the study’s sample, the incidence of rape was reduced by
50% during the year following the program.120 Rates of attempted rape and
nonconsensual sexual contact were also reported to be “significantly lower.”121
According to the authors: “[O]nly eight women would need to have participated
in the program in order to stop a nonconsensual, nonpenetrative act, and only
22 women to avert one completed rape.”122 The authors report: “most campuses
use programs that have never been formally evaluated or have not proved to be
effective in reducing the incidence of sexual assault.”123
2. Testing Sexual Assault Kits; Training Law Enforcement
The careful study of untested Sexual Assault Kits (SAKs) yields several
insights. Nationwide, thousands of such kits languish untested.124 Their neglect
has multiple causes, among them the persistence of classic rape myths which

117. DeGue, Valle, Holt, Massetti, Matjasko, & Tharp, supra note 26, at 359.
118. See Charlene Y. Senn, Misha Eliasziw, Paula C. Barata, Wilfreda E. Thurston, Ian R.
Newby-Clark, H. Lorraine Radtke, & Karen L. Hobden, Efficacy of a Sexual Assault Resistance
Program for University Women, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2326, 2326–35 (2015).
119. Id. at 2326.
120. Id. at 2332.
121. Id. at 2326.
122. Mangan, supra note 110.
123. Senn, Eliasziw, Barata, Thurston, Newby-Clark, Radtke, & Hobden, supra note 118, at
2327.
124. Lovell, Luminais, Flannery, Overman, Huang, Walker, & Clark, supra note 19, at 68.
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create skepticism and disbelief among law enforcement personnel.125 The
research shows that testing the kits leads to the identification, arrest, and
conviction of significant numbers of perpetrators, and that these apprehensions,
had they been timely, would have prevented additional sexual assaults.126
“When this occurs,” as Lovell, Luminais, Flannery, Overman, Huang, Walker,
and Clark report, “the potential exists to greatly reduce the number of future
offenses across the country.”127 What is required is “better training and
additional resources” for the officers who investigate sexual assault.128
Putting resources into the investigation of sexual assault and addressing the
rape-myth attitudes underlying the neglect of SAKs would have a number of
clear benefits. It is empirically based. It addresses key attitudinal impediments
underlying the justice system’s “inadequate response to sexual assault.”129 It
addresses disincentives for reporting sexual assault, and “sends a supportive
message to victims.”130 It is directly related to holding perpetrators
accountable. It has demonstrated benefits in terms of prevention of future
offending, largely because it addresses a much broader aspect of the problem
of sexual violence than registration and notification, which, as we have seen,
addresses only the small end of the funnel.
3. Circles of Support and Accountability
Circles of Support and Accountability (CoSA) is a program that assists
offenders to reintegrate into society after release from prison.131
CoSA is predicated on the idea that no one, not even a sex
offender, is “disposable” in society. The program attempts to
help core members successfully reenter society by providing
them with social support as they try to meet their employment,
housing, treatment, and other social needs. Through the
regular meetings that occur among circle members, CoSA is
designed to help core members forge friendships with the
volunteers in their circles. . . . But given its goal of “no more
victims,” CoSA also emphasizes accountability by insisting
125. Id. at 69; Hagerty, supra note 19.

Lovell, Luminais, Flannery, Overman, Huang, Walker & Clark, supra note 19, at 69.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id. at 68.
130. Id.
131. GRANT DUWE, THE PROMISE AND POTENTIAL OF CIRCLES OF
SUPPORT AND ACCOUNTABILITY: A SEX OFFENDER REENTRY PROGRAM 3–4
(2018), https://www.aei.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/02/The-Promise-and-Potential-of-Circles-ofSupport-and-Accountability.pdf [https://perma.cc/FL35-CFAE].
126.
127.
128.
129.
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that offenders accept responsibility for their actions.132
Grant Duwe reports on a “gold standard” random-assignment study of
Circles of Support and Accountability (CoSA) in Minnesota.133 The study
found that participation in the program lowered the risk of sexual recidivism by
88% (from 8% rearrested to 2%) and lowered the risk of recidivism for any type
of offense by 57%.134 Duwe estimates that the program results in a benefit to
the state of $40,000 per participant, returning $3.73 for every dollar spent,135
which he estimates to be 65% higher than the return from other correctional
interventions.136 Other studies have been consistent.137 Similarly, he reports that
“treatment is a cost-effective therapeutic approach” that is associated with a “3.6
percentage point difference . . . between treated and untreated sex offenders,
resulting in a 26% reduction in sexual reoffending.”138 Like CoSA, prison-based
sex-offender treatment has an return on investment estimated between $2.05
and $3.11.139 He contrasts these findings to more punitive and intrusive
measures (longer sentences, civil commitment, and the regulatory measures
this paper address), and concludes, “While studies have shown some of these
interventions can reduce sex offense recidivism, they may also yield a negligible
return on investment (ROI) due to high operational costs.”140
VIII. CONCLUSION: DISMANTLING THE RECIDIVISM-FOCUSED
SERIAL PREDATOR APPROACH
The question posed in this symposium is whether there are alternatives to
long-term incarceration to address the threat of violent recidivism. My answer
is a bit impertinent: the best way to reduce sexual violence is to stop the focus
on sexual recidivism.
I have argued in this paper that the aggressive laws that characterize our
approach to sexual violence prevention are a direct response to a focus on a
mistaken but widespread meme that sexual recidivism is “frightening and
high.” By their very structure, these laws are about separating a group from the
populace. Their structure, their framing, and their language all point
downstream, at a discrete group. They construct the problem as individual and
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id. at 5.
134. Id. at 6.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 8.
137. Giulia Lowe & Gwenda Willis, “Sex Offender” Versus “Person”: The Influence of Labels

on Willingness to Volunteer With People Who Have Sexually Abused, SEXUAL ABUSE 1, 3
(2019).
138. DUWE, supra note 131, at 3.
139. Id.
140. Id. (footnote omitted).
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aberrational, a cancer than can be excised. Their structure negates the idea that
societal practices and values condone and foster sexual violence, cover it up
and protect perpetrators. They make the pain of registrants and perpetrators
invisible, but at the same time they cast the pain of most victims of sexual
assault into the shadows: those whose victimization does not fit the paradigm,
whose crimes are not reported, whose reports are not taken seriously, or whose
victimizations could have been prevented by non-mythical, empirically based
policies.
The main thesis is that our prevention would be more effective if it
abandoned, or at least deemphasized the recidivism-based focus. More
precisely, we should put recidivism in its proper place, which is a small part of
the problem of sexual violence.
But what does that mean for the suite of policies that are so squarely based
on the recidivism myth? What are the implications of the evidence that they
represent poor resource allocation choices, with return on investments that are
inferior to other options? That they most likely have perverse consequences
that actually increase the incidence of sexual assault? That they cause pain to
hundreds of thousands of people, some of whom are former-offenders, and
many of whom are their families? That they may impair the reporting of sexual
assault?
I propose that the proper answer to this question is abolition of these socalled regulatory laws, not their reform. The very core of these laws is harmful
to the prevention effort, and to people. At their core, these laws are based on a
model that is empirically false, and ethically corrupt: the idea that “sex
offenders” are different in kind, aberrational, and are thus in a “reduced-rights”
zone. They stand for an individualistic rather than societal solution. This core
idea facilitates the harms that the #MeToo movement is exposing; it represents
the myths that underlie the failures of the criminal justice system exhibited in
the SAK crisis. In short, these laws give support to the anti-feminist gender
hierarchy that protects abusers and demeans victims.
In contrast to abolition, mere reform would leave the core idea of these laws
intact. And experience has shown that it is probably not possible to have a wellcontained, limited version of these laws.141 Further, to the extent that individual
assessment suggests that community supervision and behavioral restrictions are
advisable for particular individuals as they are released from prison, the
criminal justice system provides tools to impose those limits.142 The criminal
system can certainly be excessive; but it is based on treating offenders as human
141. Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics of Sexual
Violence, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2004).
142. Id. at 1253.
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beings who are accountable for their actions, rather than as “others” who may
be regulated like nuclear waste.
In the end, the predator laws are just morally wrong. As a justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court opined: “Today the target is people who are sexually
dangerous. Which class of people, who are different from us and who we do
not like, will it be tomorrow?”143

143.
In re Matter of Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 202 (Minn. 1996) (Page, J., dissenting).

Mitchell Hamline Open Access
Mitchell Hamline Open Access is the digital archive of Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
Its mission is to preserve and provide access to our scholarly activities, for the benefit of
researchers and members of the legal community.
Mitchell Hamline Open Access is a service of the Warren E. Burger Library.
open.mitchellhamline.edu

© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
875 Summit Avenue, Saint Paul, MN 55105

mitchellhamline.edu

